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hiStorical information Gathered from Mauricii Strategicon
This paper arose from the study of the military treatise of the late 6th 
c., which aims to translate the text into Modern Greek (forthcoming, 
followed by a commentary). The editions of the Strategicon by Mihăescu 
and by Dennis1, provided the excellent background for the presentation of 
the military treatise to contemporary audiences in Greece. Additionally, 
the relevant titles of Mihăescu, Dennis and Rance, plus the secondary 
bibliography dealing with Byzantine military history of Late Antiquity, 
served as a special guide for the commentary. In this paper some of the 
comments are discussed in detail. 
 
a. Alternative Reading  
Σχολή (schola palatina) instead of σχολή (σχολή/ σχόλη i.e. spare time)
The Greek word σχολή appears in the manuscripts of the Strategicon 
of Maurice twice in singular, I.6,6 (CFHB 17, 92); VII.A.4,2 (CFHB 17, 
232), and once in plural, I.8,23 (CFHB 17, 100). Evidently, in accordance 
with the military terminology of the late 6th c., the meaning of the word 
σχολή in the latter case is that of the military unit2, i.e. σχολὴ or τάγμα: ... 
1. Das Strategikon des Maurikios, ed. G.T. denniS – trans. e. GamillScheG [CFHB 
17], Wien 1981, hereafter CFHB 17; Mauricii Strategicon: Arta Militarâ, ed. h. mihăeScu 
[Scriptores Byzantini 6], Bucharest 1970, hereafter SB 6. The translation into Modern Greek 
was completed a few years ago, at a time that the study of Ph. Rance was not available 
(The Roman Art of War in Late Antiquity: The Strategicon of the Emperor Maurice. A 
Translation with Introduction and Commentary, trans. Ph. rance [Birmingham Byzantine 
and Ottoman Monographs 11], London 2006).
2. See A. A. M. JoneS, The Later Roman Empire 284-602, v. 1-2, Oxford 1964 (Oxford 
1990), 1.54, I.613-614; J. F. Haldon, Byzantine Praetorians: an Αdministrative, Institutional 
and Social Survey of the Opsikion and Tagmata, c. 500-900 [Ποικίλα Βυζαντινὰ 3], Bonn 
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σωφρονίζεσθαι καὶ οὐλτίμους γίνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἤτοι 
τῶν σχολῶν ἐν αἷς ἀναφέρονται (... to be punished and to be reduced to 
the lower rank inside the scholē in which they are registered). Gamillscheg 
(17, 101) by translating the original σχολῶν into Truppenkörper does not 
convey the term σχολή, of which the use of the pure form might render 
to this passage a certain official (military) origin. The entry of the exact 
word σχολὴ occurred either because it was formally copied from a specific 
manuscript or accidentally because the oral speech was recorded at this 
point. In any case the interpretation of the I.8,24 is not affected at all3. The 
singular form of the word σχολὴ appears at first as a military regulation to 
be taught to both soldiers and junior officers, I.6,6 (CFHB 17, 92/ CFHB 
17, 93: freien Zeit). It has been placed at the front of the sentence of the 
remarkable final part of the first book that includes three chapters I.6; I.7; 
I.8; (CFHB 17, 92-100). The word in singular appears once again in relation 
to the moral encouragement of soldiers which had to be exercised by the 
officers or the candatores, i.e. the military orators, VII.A.4,2 (CFHB 17, 
232/ CFHB 17, 233: während der Ruhe). In both cases the editors of the 
Strategicon, Mihăescu (SB 6, 62; 168) and Dennis (CFHB 17, 92; 232), 
interpret “spare time”, given the undisputed meaning of the Greek word 
σχολή 4. 
In VII.A.4,2 (CFHB 17, 232), the phrase comes as a part of a small 
chapter of eight verses, which is standing in a subdivision of the treatise 
with plenty of different unofficial instructions, applicable to everyday 
life inside the camp5. In fact this is the end of a distinguished matter not 
1984, 119; ODB, v. 3 entry Scholae Palatinae (A. Kazhdan). The Late Roman elite units 
named scholae palatinae had been founded in order to serve the emperor as his personal 
guard; on scholae palatinae see R. I. Frank, Scholae Palatinae, Rome 1969.
3. See also Maurice’s Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine military strategy, trans. G. Τ. 
DenniS, Philadelphia 1984, 20: (“...to be punished and to be reduced to the lower rank inside 
their unit or the schola in which they are registered”).
4. Meaning: Sudae Lexicon, ed. A. Adler, v. I-IV, Leipzig 1928-32, (Stuttgart 1971), 
IV.492: n. 7066 σχολὴ ἡ εὐκαιρία; Etymology: D. DemetrakoS, Mέγα λεξικὸν ὅλης τῆς 
ἑλληνικῆς γλώσσης, Athens 1949-1950, 7066: σχόλη/σκόλη/σχολὴ [scholē (school)> 
a-scholia (occupation)> schole (spare time)].
5. VII.A. Περὶ στρατηγίας. Ποίων δεῖ κεφαλαίων φροντίσαι τὸν στρατηγὸν πρὸ τοῦ 
καιροῦ τοῦ πολέμου. (Maurice’s Strategikon, trans. DenniS, 64: “Strategy. The Points which 
the General must consider”). 
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discussed by the Strategicon, but several handbooks are devoted to it at the 
time, that actually perform a very special literature, called the rhetorica 
militaris6. The text reads as follows: Χρὴ ἐπὶ σχολῆς συνάγειν κατὰ μέρη ἢ 
μοίρας τὸν στρατὸν ... καὶ διαλέγεσθαι τὰ εἰκότα καὶ προθυμοποιεῖσθαι 
.../ CFHB 17, 233:  Während der Ruhe soll man das Heer nach Divisionen 
oder Regimenten … ihnen das Passende sagen und sie anfeuern … (“At some 
convenient time the troops should be assembled by meros or moira... Suitable 
speeches should be given to encourage them…”7) and therefore we learn 
that the officers had to take advantage of addressing the soldiers during 
their spare time, in order to polish their warrior spirit. The process of the 
encouragement of the army, presented by the author of the Strategicon in 
VII.A.4,2-8 (CFHB 17, 232, 234), could well be connected with the “spare 
time” of soldiers. The officers of higher or even middle rank, who had to 
supervise or simply watch any activity of the soldiers, were aware of the 
proper time to assemble the army and provide the men with some extra 
enthusiasm or at least to confirm it. Beyond any doubt, the factor that 
ordered every special treatment of military morale should have been certain 
particular situations plus all normal occasions (like march). As far as 
strengthening of the morale of the soldiers is concerned, it is worthwhile to 
recall that at that time, a very common practice was the attempt to enforce 
the men to sing or to listen to military songs and heroic stories, told by the 
candatores habitually during the march8. In fact, the abstract in discussion 
relates to this very habit. The formal speech of the general that, according 
to the Roman tradition, used to take place before the battle, plus various, 
conventional, ruses also served to hearten the army9. Certain clichés are 
inaudibly cited within the Strategicon10. 
6. H. HunGer, Die hochsprachliche Profane Literatur der Byzantiner, v.1-2, München 
1978, v. 2, 328 [=Bυζαντινὴ Λογοτεχνία: ἡ λόγια κοσμικὴ γραμματεία τῶν Bυζαντινῶν, v. 
1-3, Athens 2005, v.3 (“Πολεμική Tέχνη”), 155-182, trans. T. G. KoliaS, Athens 2005, 165 
and n. 25. 
7. Maurice’s Strategikon, trans. DenniS, 66.
8. A routine of German origin, which became extremely popular inside the Roman 
army, see J. F. VerbruGGen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, 
London 1997, 88-89.
9. On the rhetorical devices used by the Byzantine generals see hunGer, Ηochsprachliche 
Literatur 2, 328 [=Bυζαντινὴ Λογοτεχνία 3, 165].
10. VIII.A,47-48; 49-50; VIII.B,83-84; �.4, (CFHB 17, 270; 272; 284) [transmission 
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In contrast, the issue of the transmission of military regulations 
to the army, i.e. the case of the first mentioning of the word σχολή, I.6,6 
(CFHB 17, 92), could not have been an informal action. It has already been 
mentioned that this is the case of the introduction of a rather big part of 
the first book and not a simple entry of a piece of information. But above 
all, the Strategicon is unique source conveying the legal system of the camp 
in Byzantine military history, according to which the army was prepared 
to obey certain principles beyond drill commands. It is therefore quite 
important to establish an accurate interpretation. The full quotation forms 
the introductory paragraph of three relevant chapters, where the detailed 
rules plus the penalties could all be found. These are chapter nr. 6 comprising 
41 verses containing 10 accurate rules for the interest of the soldiers (CFHB 
17, 92, 94, 96), chapter nr. 7 comprising 19 verses containing four rules 
particularly for the officers (CFHB 17, 96, 98) and chapter nr. 8 comprising 
33 verses (CFHB 17, 98, 100) which includes five rules for the concern of 
the entire army at war, I.6,3-6 (CFHB 17, 92). The text reads as follows: 
Μετὰ τὸ ὀρδινευθῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι τὰ κοντουβέρνια δεῖ συναγαγεῖν τὸ 
τάγμα κατὰ δεκαρχίαν, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐπιγιγνώσκουσιν οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ διὰ τοῦ 
νόμου μανδάτα τῆς κοθοσιώσεως, ἐπεί τοί γε ἐγγράφως ἐπὶ σχολῆς διὰ 
τοῦ ἰδικοῦ ἄρχοντος εἰπεῖν ταῦτα./ CFHB 17, 93: “Nach der Gliederung 
und nach der Bildung der Gruppen muss man die Schwadron nach Gruppen 
versammeln. Und wenn die Soldaten in der Schwadron die gesetzlichen 
Vorschriften über die Disziplin kennen, (ist es gut), andererseits soll man 
ihnen in der freien Zeit schriftlich durch den eigenen Kommandanten 
folgendes mitteilen”; according to the current interpretation the meaning is 
the following: When the troops have been organized and the squads formed, 
the tagma should assemble by decarchies. It is well if the men are already 
familiar with the regulations about military crimes set down in the laws. 
Otherwise the commanding officer should read out of the written copy 
during their spare time11.
of some false announcement of supposedly victory of the fellow units; concealment of the 
unpleasant news from the army; heartening pusillanimous soldiers via tricks]; X.4,14 (CFHB 
17, 348) [formal, encouraging speech the day before the battle]. On the psychology of the 
army at war compare C. G. Karapli, Κατευόδωσις στρατοῦ, ἡ ὀργάνωση καὶ ἡ ψυχολογικὴ 
προετοιμασία τοῦ βυζαντινοῦ στρατοῦ πρὶν ἀπὸ τὸν πόλεμο (610-1081), Athens 2010.
11. Maurice’s Strategikon, trans. DenniS, 17-18: “When the troops have been organized 
and the squads formed, the tagma should assemble by decarchies. It is well if the men are 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 08/11/2019 17:02:52 |
BYZANTINA ΣΥΜΜΕΙΚΤΑ 23 (2013) 59-89
63HISTORICAL INFORMATION GATHERED FROM MAURICII STRATEGICON
The testified delivery of the military regulation simultaneously to both 
soldiers, chapter nr. 6 and officers, chapter nr. 7, constitutes an important 
piece of information. Then only the literate senior officers could have been 
responsible for the transmission, i.e. at least the leaders of the μέρος, the force 
of the 1000 men, because, according to the Strategicon I.4,16-17 (CFHB 17, 
88) those mērarchae were supposed εἰδότας, εἰ δυνατόν, καὶ γράμματα 
(ought to be capable to read and write, if possible). Apparently the officers 
of even higher rank should had been educated as well, but as far as the 
recruiting of others is concerned, this factor is not an issue at all in the 
chapter that concerns the arrangement of the military force. However the 
accomplishment of certain tasks depended totally on literate officers, like 
the duties of the mandatores (heralds) who should had been acquainted with 
Greek, Latin and Persian, according to XII.B.7,3-4 (CFHB 17, 424), and 
thus the number of the highly educated officers should had been adequate 
within the army of the late 6th c.12. 
As far as the rank of the (ε)ἰδικὸς ἄρχων (the special officer/ CFHB 
17, 93: eigenen Kommandanten) is concerned, i.e. the officer who had 
to read the mandatum from the script, a certain penalty is worthy of 
attention. I.6,29-31 (CFHB 17, 94 rule nr. 8), applied to the commander of 
10, the decarch, who had not attended to the duty of conveying the military 
law to his subordinates: Εἴ τις ἀκούσας τὰ μανδάτα τοῦ δεκάρχου μὴ 
φυλάξῃ, σωφρονιζέσθω· εἰ δὲ ἀγνοῶν τὰ μανδάτα πταίσῃ, ὁ δεκάρχης 
σωφρονιζέσθω, ἐπειδὴ οὐ προεῖπεν αὐτῷ (“If anyone after hearing the 
orders of his decarch does not carry them out, he shall be punished. But 
if he does not do so out the ignorance of the orders, the decarch should 
be punished for not having informed him beforehand”)13. This rule might 
apply to the orders on the battlefield. However it might well apply also to 
the duty of enforcing the soldiers to participate in the process of the formal 
reading. Any further involvement of the decarch in the transmission of 
military law should be considered as totally improbable, unless one accepts 
that every decarch was literate and therefore capable of reading from the 
already familiar with the regulations about military crimes set down in the laws. Otherwise 
the commanding officer should read out of the written copy”.
12. S. Gyftopoulou, Το ‘Target Group’ του Στρατηγικού του Μαυρικίου και η 
ταυτότητα του συντάκτη, Βυζαντινός Δόμος 17 (2010), 341-360, esp. 344-345.  
13. Maurice’s Strategikon, trans. DenniS, 18.
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script, plus having full access to the script, in other words owning a copy 
for personal use. The decarch, an archon according to VII.B.11,37 (CFHB 
17, 254), is not mentioned among the officers who were given written 
copies with military instructions, i.e. in VII.B.16, 3-5 (CFHB 17, 260); 
VII.B.17,1-3 (CFHB 17, 262). 
According to the routine described in I.6,3-6 (CFHB 17, 92) the decarch 
had to ask the men of the squad if they were aware of the rules or not and 
then, under his supervision, the veterans were dismissed; but everybody 
else had to be present and to listen to the special document, read by an 
authorized military officer to each unit (τάγμα or σχολή) to all the squads 
of the unit (the groups of ten assembled for the occasion, i.e. the men and the 
officers of every low rank). This action had to take place immediately after 
the formation of the military force. It is difficult to assume that the actual 
reading took place during the spare time of the soldiers, when every military 
man involved was available. We should admit that the report of the defined 
process might well be justified, on condition that the transmission of the 
military law to the army had been a procedure of an administrative nature. 
Τὰ μανδάτα περὶ καθοσιώσεως, I.6,1-2 (CFHB 17, 92), (The mandates 
related to high treason) were not to be read occasionally. Nor could the 
literate high officer wait for the convenient moment in order to transmit the 
military law to the army force. Since the infantrymen had to assemble at a 
specified day in order to listen to the military law, according to XII.II.10,43 
(CFHB 17, 430), the cavalry probably used to fulfill this obligation as well. 
Remarkably, no process is mentioned at all with regard to the fundamental 
yet not ritual, encouragement of the soldiers during their σχολή (spare 
time), in chapter VII.A, 1-3 (CFHB 17, 226).
Given the scholarly accuracy of the alternative reading Σχολή/ tagma 
(= unit) instead of σχολή/ σχόλη (= spare time), we should consent to the 
following interpretation of the introductory sentence of the Strategicon I.6,3-
6 (CFHB 17, 92): Immediately after the troops have being organized and the 
squads formed, the tagma should assemble by decarchies and if the men 
(inside it) are aware of the offences against military law, it is fine; otherwise 
the special archon of each schola should tell them out of the writ. It has 
been suggested that the mandatum, in other words the short constitution, 
of the scholae palatinae could had served as the prototype for the author 
of the Strategicon, for the composition of certain chapters of the first book, 
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the ones with the regulation and the penalties14. This hypothesis should be 
connected with the fact that the scholae are documented twice in the first 
subdivision of the treatise, the Εἰσαγωγὴ (Introduction), I.6,6 :CFHB 17, 92; 
I.8,25: CFHB 17, 100. 
The classic enemies of every Army: Starvation (limos: famine) and 
Contagion (loimos: epidemic)
All four sections of the twelfth book of the military treatise indubitably 
relate to the field forces15. The issues concerning the infantry are documented 
in XII.B within a rather swift presentation. Part B actually follows A, the one 
concerning the “convex” army force at the battlefield, and thus constitutes an 
absolutely useful manual for the interest of the cavalry as well. The overview 
of the infantry, which is discussed in a total of 27 chapters compared with 
the 108 chapters that are addressed to the cavalry, does not prevent the 
author of the Strategicon from communicating an authentic feature of the 
peditum of the late 6th c. 
Firm instructions concerning the foundations of the camps of the 
infantry are presented by way of XII.B.22 (CFHB 17, 472-480). They relate 
to the conditions that were considered to be crucial for the effectiveness of 
the potential military camp and therefore they did draw attention: Πῶς δεῖ 
τὰ ἄπληκτα γίνεσθαι ἤτοι φοσσάτα (“Setting up Fortified Camps”)16. A 
certain guideline concerning the setting up of camps acquaints us with special 
information, XII.Β, 22.61 (CFHB 17, 476): μὴ χρόνον πολὺν ἐνδιατρίβειν 
ἐν ἑνὶ χωρίῳ, εἰ μήπω περί τε ἀέρας καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια χρειῶδές ἐστιν, διὰ 
τὸ μὴ λοιμώττειν τὸν στρατὸν (“healthy, clean places should be chosen for 
camps, and we should not stay too long in one spot. Otherwise, disease can 
spread among the troops”)17. The same memorandum is repeated in the 
form of a γνωμικὸν (saying), which is indubitably connected with the choice 
of the campground, VIII.B,206-207 (CFHB 17, 292 <nr. 75>): κατανοείτω 
τὸ χωρίον ὁ στρατηγός, εἰ ὑγιεινόν τε καὶ σωτήριον, ἢ νοσερὸν, καὶ τοῖς 
14. Gyftopoulou, Target Group, 346-347.
15. Maurice’s Strategikon, trans. denniS, 127; 137; 164; 165: XII.A “Mixed Order of 
Battle”; XII.B “Infantry Formations”; XII.C “Diagram of a Fortified Camp”; XII.D. Hunting 
Wild Animals without Serious Injury or Accident”.
16  Maurice’s Strategikon, trans. denniS, 158.
17. Maurice’s Strategikon, trans. denniS, 160.
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οἰκείοις πολέμιον … (“the general should know the country well, whether 
it is healthy and safe or unhealthy and thus hostile towards his troops …”)18. 
In the ninth chapter of the first book, a common case of the assembly 
of the army inside a temporary camp occurs, in which the same principle of 
hygiene is detected. It is documented among certain fundamental regulations 
referring to the march of the army throughout the Roman dominion. 
Mihăescu read, I.9,8 (SB 6, 68): καὶ μὴ συνάγειν ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ τὸν πάντα 
στρατὸν διά τε τὸ μὴ λ[ο]ιμώττειν αὐτὸν εὐχερῶς, μηδὲ εὐσύνοπτον τοῖς 
ἐχθροῖς γίγνεσθαι, μηδὲ εἰς βοσκὰς στενοῦσθαι (the whole army should 
not be brought together in one place because disease could easily spread 
among the men, the army’s size could be easily estimated by the enemy, 
and fodder might be hard to obtain). Mihăescu has provided the apparatus 
criticus with the relevant clause from Sylloge Tacticorum [SB 6, 68: the 
note on verse nr. 9 includes “Vari: λοιμικὰς νόσους γίνεσθαι” (contagious 
diseases are produced)], which in fact clarifies the insight of the editor at 
this point. Dennis, on the other hand, chose to convey (I.9,13-15: CFHB 
17, 102): καὶ μὴ συνάγειν ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ τὸν πάντα στρατὸν διά τε τὸ μὴ 
λιμώττειν αὐτὸν εὐχερῶς, μηδὲ εὐσύνοπτον τοῖς ἐχθροῖς γίγνεσθαι, μηδὲ 
εἰς βοσκὰς στενοῦσθαι (“the whole army should not be brought together 
in one place because the men might find themselves quickly starving, the 
army’s size… etc)19. 
But the Strategicon itself, as has already become evident, permits only 
one lucid interpretation, as far as the assembly of the army in the same 
camp is concerned: the gathering of men together is always, i.e. throughout 
the total text, combined with the peril of disease, which normally sprood 
in camps in such occasions. In several historical events the epidemic crises 
inside military camps were caused by the shortage of the water supplies or 
the contamination of the fresh water20, a possibility which is recorded by 
the author of the Strategicon, in X.4,45; 50; XII.B.22,71-73 (CFHB 17, 350; 
476); additionally the large number of men and animals in the same place 
could obviously favor insects, bacteria, viruses and the consequent diffusion 
18. Maurice’s Strategikon, trans. denniS, 89.
19. Maurice’s Strategikon, trans. denniS, 21.
20. D. Ch. StathakopouloS, Famine and Pestilence in the Late Roman and early 
Byzantine Empire [Birmingham Byzantine and Ottoman Monographs 9], Ashgate 2004, 97-
99; 164.
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of any infectious disease21, the existing conditions of sanitation inside the 
camp notwithstanding. Furthermore, the reading of Mihăescu coincides 
with our (modern) conception of the gathering of many people, something 
certainly to be avoided during an epidemic in order to be protected. The 
conclusion should be that, apparently, a usual lapsus calami is illustrated 
at this point, and therefore the reading of Mihăescu, I.9,8 (SB 6, 68) is the 
proper one. Precisely, the word in discussion was written down incorrectly 
in one manuscript, which actually represents the most reliable manuscript of 
the treatise: λιμόττειν (limottein), instead of λοιμώττειν (loimōttein<loimos: 
contagious disease) or λιμώττειν (limōttein<limos: starvation). The use of 
“o” instead of “ω” in this part of the verb is the grammatical rule that has 
been broken, what in fact unveils the lapsus calami, i.e. the transfer of the 
letter “o” from the first syllable and the consequential replacement of the 
“ω” in the following syllable. Then again the right form λοιμώττειν has also 
entered into a reliable group of manuscripts, in addition to the corrupted 
λιμόττειν 22.
Poor nutrition could also result in weakness and consequently disease23, 
but this case is not presented within the Strategicon. The issue of famine 
is naturally documented within the military treatise, as it happened to 
be a serious threat against the wellbeing, even the survival, of both men 
and animals. Starvation is presented as a grave threat, a sort of weapon 
that was used directly against the population under siege, a fact reported 
in the tenth book of the Srategicon, concerning the topic of siege, and by 
means of γνωμικὸν VIII.B,10; 76,77 (CFHB 17, 278 <nr. 4>; 282 <nr. 28>): 
ἢ δόλοις ἢ ἐφόδοις ἢ λιμῷ τοὺς πολεμίους βλάπτειν καλόν, and μέγιστα 
κατορθοῖ στρατηγὸς λιμῷ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων δύναμιν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς 
ὅπλοις καταλύσειν πειρώμενος (“it is well to hurt the enemy by deceit, by 
raids, or by hunger”; and “the general achieves the most who tries to destroy 
21. StathakopouloS, Famine 115; 121; 300. Compare R.D.K. PeterSon, Insects, Disease 
and Military History: The Napoleonic Campaigns and Historical Perception, American 
Entomologist 41.3 (1995), 147-161, concerning the diseases that resulted to the death of 
many soldiers of Napoleon after the defeat in Russia in 1812, during the retreat through 
Poland in extremely frosty conditions that favored the assembly of the men.
22. See CFHB 17, 102 (the apparatus criticus for I.9,14): “14 λιμώττειν VNPLp: 
λιμόττειν M: λοιμώττειν Alt”.
23. StathakopouloS, Famine 164; 275-276; 300.
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the enemy’s army more by hunger than by force of arms”)24. In the quotation 
discussed above, concerning the assembly of the army, famine is also 
mentioned in the context of camp management, relating though exclusively 
to military horses. At this point it should be underlined that the case of 
the difficulty of feeding the animals is presented in I.9,13-15 (CFHB 17, 
102) as the third argument against the assembly of the total military force 
inside the same camp. In general the animals were to suffer severely if the 
servants were not capable of collecting enough grass to feed them, because 
of potential foe squads outside the camp. In such cases they became weak 
and the soldiers turned coward25. The common occurence is also mentioned 
in IV.4,13-15 (CFHB 17, 212, 214) as well as in IX.3,11-15 (CFHB 17, 312). 
The danger that an army force might face if deprivation of food ever 
arose does not appear anywhere in the treatise as a camp or a campaign topic. 
Indeed, providing for the soldiers of the imperial army is plainly presented 
to work out consistently, such as in I.2,86-91 (CFHB 17, 82). The author of 
the Strategicon assesses that weapons, clothing, and food formed one and the 
same category of the logistics in both the instructions just mentioned and 
the relevant γνωμικὸν (saying) VIII.B, 49-50 (CFHB 17, 280 <nr.19>). It is 
clear to the author of the military treatise that the men were to be fed from 
the supplies that had been collected throughout the proximate provinces, 
with the support of imperial services, and had been carried for them by the 
transport means of each military unit or/and available imperial means26. 
Finally, a limited amount was captured during the military operation 
of pillaging. Although the instruction to ensure that the water resource 
should be accessible, no matter the circumstance, is given to the general 
in a plenty of clauses27, field rationing does not appear to be considered 
24. Maurice’s Strategikon, trans. DenniS, 83; 85.
25. The relevant passage in the chapter concerning the collection of grass goes as follow, 
VII.B.10,18-24 (CFHB 17, 248-250): …οὐδεὶς θαρρεῖ ἐξέρχεσθαι εἰς συλλογὴν χόρτου καὶ 
οἱ ἵπποι λιμώττοντες ἀθυμίαν τοῖς στρατιώταις παρέχουσι… (…nobody dares to go out to 
gather fodder, so the starving equi result to soldiers without spirit).
26. A single citation in IX.3,12 (CFHB 17, 312): διὰ βασταγῆς δημοσίας (by public 
means of carrying) which refers specifically to the invaded foreign land.
27. See for example VII.A,6-8 (CFHB 17, 236): φοσσάτα ὀχυρώτερα ποιεῖν ἐν 
ἐπιτηδείοις τόποις ἔνθα δυνατὸν τὸ ὕδωρ πάντως ἐκδικεῖσθαι ἐν καιρῷ ἀνάγκης (you 
must establish the camps in such places where you always will defend the water no matter 
the difficulty).
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equally fragile. Regarding to the extensive details on the management of the 
water supplies, X.4,41 -62 (CFHB 17, 348, 350), the mention of access to 
field rationing should be contrasted; this appears to become breakable only 
twice: in IX.3,11-15 (CFHB 17, 312) plus X.4,9 (CFHB 17, 346), applying to 
the invaded foreign land, and in X.2.31-34 (CFHB 17, 342), concerning the 
army force under siege.
Under Maurice (582-602), the most likely food supplies during war 
used to be within the competence of the imperial management, along 
with the armoury and the military livestock, that is to say far beyond the 
official concern of the particular military authorities during any specific 
campaign28. According to the Strategicon the process of feeding the men runs 
on a fundamental schedule, after which the general had barely to guarantee 
the final course, i.e. to put the supplies into action in order to serve the well 
being of the units under his command. On balance, food was at hand in 
every army corps, for the military bases inside and outside the empire were 
definitely specified. Even the impermanent camps that served particular 
battle were specified29. According to the penalty nr. 19 of the military law 
28. This exact practice used to be the norm during Late Antiquity, see JoneS, Later 
Roman Empire, 629-630; compare StathakopouloS, Famine, 197; during the 6th c., even 
further institutions, non military the most likely, concerning the provisions for the army at 
war were established and, as far as Balkans is concerned, they probably functioned during 
the first decades of the 7th c. see A. E. GkoutzioukoStaS – Χ. Μ. moniaroS, Η περιφερειακή 
διοικητική αναδιοργάνωση της βυζαντινής αυτοκρατορίας από τον Ιουστινιανό Α΄ 
(527-565): η περίπτωση της Quaestura Iustiniana Exercitus [EBΕ 22] Θεσσαλονίκη 2009, 
194, 213-232; on the supposed military nature of the latter see J. wiewiorowSki, Quaestor 
Iustinianus Exercitus – A Late Military Commander?, Eos. Commentariis Societatis 
Philologae Polonorum 93.2. (2006), 317-340. See also E. raGia, The Geography of the 
Provincial Administration of the Byzantine Empire (ca 600-1200): I.1. The Apothekai of 
Asia Minor (7th c. – 8th c.), ByzSym 19 (2009), 195-245, esp. 197-200 on the probable 
interconnection between the economic institution of the Warehouses and the catering of the 
army forces from ca the middle 7th c. onwards, and 203-225: on the geographical distribution 
of Warehouses across Asia Minor in view of martial operations as well; eadem, The geography 
of the provincial administration of the Byzantine empire (ca 600-1200): I.2. Apothekai of the 
Balkans and the islands of the Aegean Sea (7th – 8th c.), BSl 69 (2011), 86-113, esp. 87-113: 
establishment – distribution of Warehouses in Balkans and Aegean Sea.
29. See K. zuckerman, The Early Byzantine Strongholds in Easter Pontos, TM 11 (1991), 527-
533, esp. 528, 531. On a later era, 10th c., military bases are documented at the northern coastline 
of the Black See, across Asia Minor (the famous “βασιλικὰ ἄπληκτα”) and at specific islands of 
the Aegean See, see G. L. huxley, Topics in Byzantine Historical Geography, Proceedings of the 
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at war, lying in I.8,26-30 (CFHB 17, 100), units that faced dreadful danger 
ought to pursue refuge exclusively in those particular camps and they were 
not allowed to seek safeness elsewhere, where supplies or protection were 
not given. Occasionally in some situation the generals did not really have 
the choice to enter an actual camp30. But apparently the official military 
theory could never allow the issue of famine to become a potential threat to 
the imperial army.
Skoulkatores (Patrols) instead of Mandatores (Heralds) 
According to the VII.B.16,20 (CFHB 17, 260) the mandatores, i.e. 
the ἀγγελιοφόροι (heralds), perform the duty of scouting: Χρὴ ἐν καιρῷ 
παρατάξεως διὰ μανδατόρων προερευνᾶν τοὺς τῆς συμβολῆς τόπους, 
τουτέστιν τοὺς μέσον τῆς ἰδίας καὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν,… (“when the lines are 
being formed, heralds (spies) should scout the area where the battle is 
expected, that is, the ground between our lines and the enemy”)31. Mihăescu 
as well in VII.B.16,15 (SB 6, 190) has written down μανδάτορες (heralds). 
The previous sentence, which is not included in the text of Dennis, clearly 
refers to patrols: VII.B.16,12-14 (SB 6, 190) ὥστε ἐν καιρῷ μάχης, ὡς ὁ 
τόπος ἀπαιτεῖ, ἔνθα τάσσεται, οὕτως καὶ τὰς σκούλκας ἔχειν ἢ ἀπὸ δύο 
μιλίων (at the time of the conflict the scouts must perform according to 
the need of the area or from the distance of two miles…), what in fact is 
immediately repeated below, i.e. in the quotation discussed at this point. 
The scoulcator (the patrol) was associated routinely with the action 
of exploration, as it is confirmed in every other relevant passage of the 
Strategicon. The patrol, who was also called spy at that time, had to scout: 
Royal Irish Academy. Section C: Archaeology, Celtic Studies, History, Linguistics, Literature
v. 82C.4, (1982), 89-110, esp. 97 and n. 3, 99, 106. The reliable documents are: Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando Imperio, ed. Gy. moravcSik – trans. R. J. H. JenkinS, 
[CFHB 1 = Dumbarton Oaks Texts 1], Washington D. C. 1967, 55-110 (ch. 45); Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus. Three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions, ed. J. F. Haldon, [CFHB 
28], Wien 1990, 80 (ch. A.3-5); G.L. Huxley, (ed.), A Porphyrogenitan Portulan, GRBS 17 
(1976), 295-300. 
30. Once the defeated Byzantine army “suffered cruel death because of famine and 
cold, because they spend the harsh winter in the mountains”, see details in StathakopouloS, 
Famine, 300.
31. Maurice’s Strategikon, trans. denniS, 76; on mandator see ODB, v. 2. entry 
mandator (A. kazhdan).
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Ι.3,36 (CFHB 17, 88): Σκουλκάτορες οἱ κατάσκοποι λέγονται (the spies 
are called patrols); VII.A.3,4 p. 232 διὰ κατασκόπων ἤτοι ἐκσπλορατόρων 
(by spies in other words patrols); VII.B.13,1-21 (CFHB 17, 256) περὶ 
σκούλκας (“reconnaissance”)32, and XII.B.20,21-23 (CFHB 17, 460) …
προπορεύεσθαι…καὶ ἑκατέρωθεν [τῆς τάξεως] περιπατεῖν, ἵνα μὲν καὶ 
σκουλκεύουσιν (… walk in advance… and march outside of both the sides [of 
the unit] in order to explore). It should be preferable to read σκουλκατόρων 
instead of μανδατόρων at the VII.B.16,20 (CFHB 17, 260), as well, for, 
obviously, in such a situation the appropriate request ought to have been the 
performance of the patrol. In addition, this suggestion complies perfectly 
with the military protocol of the Strategicon, as far as the “reconnaissance” 
issue is concerned. But no manuscript permits such a treatment of the text33. 
The Question Title 
The βίβλος (treatise) that embodies the συγγραφὴ (composition) of 
certain functional military treatises known as the Strategicon of Maurice34, 
consists of 138 chapters arranged in 12 λόγοι (books) and eight different 
sections35, by means of which three books are formed (VII.A and B, VIII.A 
and B and XII.A, B, C and D). Thirty of a total of 138 titles of the chapters 
of the original text of the Strategicon commence with the word πῶς (how). In 
almost every chapter of the treatise such titles are initiated through a sentence 
that normally gives a strict answer to a direct question. In view of the fact that 
the absence of any proper introductory word is remarkable, the reader enjoys 
the syntax of the first sentence if a question mark closes the title, like in I.1,3-
5 (CFHB 17, 74): the title is Πῶς δεῖ γυμνάζειν τὸν καθ’ ἕνα ἄνδρα… (how 
to train each individual soldier …) and the text below begins Εἰς τὸ τοξεύειν 
32. Maurice’s Strategikon, trans. denniS, 75; On scoulcator see Ph. rance, The Fulcum, 
the Late Roman and Byzantine Testudo: the Germanization of Roman Infantry Tactics?, 
GRBS 44 (2004), 265-326, esp. 309 n. 88.
33. See CFHB 17, 260 (the apparatus criticus for VII.B.16,20): all manuscripts convey 
μανδατόρων (heralds).
34. “Treatise” is the equivalent for biblos, cited in XI.4, 228 (CFHB 17, 338) and 
“composition” for συγγραφή, cited in Praef. ,15-16 = 56-57 (CFHB 17, 68).
35. λόγος literally is the “speech”, the “lecture,” and in fact each λόγος corresponds to 
one minor treatise; μέρος is the common Greek term for “section”; the three books comprising 
the eight sections are marked with numbers but bear no title; the two last sections of the 12th 
book, contain one chapter each.
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πεζῇ… (To shoot on foot…). The peculiar syntax can also be found in the nine 
sentences below the titles which commence with the word “what”; so the titles 
in question represent one fourth of the titles of the treatise36. However, in a 
few cases, an introductory sentence has indeed been added between the title 
and the presentation of the topic; but it merely preserves the order of certain 
action, such as in the first and the twelfth books37. In a far fewer cases even 
a whole paragraph can be found, which communicates to the reader some 
military theory, as it happens in the ninth book38.
According to SB 6 (ed. Mihăescu) all these titles are pure direct questions 
and therefore the text below naturally commences without any introduction. 
The impression is certainly given that Mihăescu read the Strategicons 
with the mind set of a military officer, as he had been one. The choice of 
Mihăescu appears to be the literal interpretation (the direct question-title). 
According to CFHB 17 (ed. Dennis) indirect questions eventually title 
all these chapters of the Strategicon. The syntactical irregularity appears 
quite often in section B of the twelfth book. Similarly in certain cases in 
which the title begins with the word περὶ (on), the introductory word of the 
first sentence does not appear in the text, even though it is required by the 
syntax; but normally the chapters below such titles are complete texts. The 
typical introductory word of the treatise for the situation, if the text comes 
immediately right to the point, is χρὴ (thou must), which sometimes is also 
given for the “how” case39. Eventually the choice of Dennis appears to be the 
academic proposal (the indirect question-title).
Dennis included only one question mark by taking into consideration 
the XII.A.7, what actually comes as a double titled chapter, presented 
through a special array. In this case the title given by the editor of the CFHB 
17 comes in a parenthesis and the first sentence of the chapter is a direct 
question. According to the XII.A.7, 1-3 (CFHB 17, 408) the title is Τάξις ἡ 
36. “How”: I.1,2,3,4,5,9; III.9; VI.5; IX.3,4; I.1,2,3,4; XI.1,2,3,4; XII.A.1; XII
.B.1,3,8,9,11,12,13,17,18,19,20,21,22,23; XII.D; what: I.6,7; XII.B.1,5,610,14,16,23; what for: 
XII.B.16,9.
37. Such as in I.2,3 (CFHB 17, 76); I.4,3-6 (CFHB 17, 88); I.5,4 (CFHB 17, 90); I.6,3-6 
(CFHB 17,92); XII.B.17,3-5 (CFHB 17, 450).
38. Such as in IX.3,1-10 (CFHB 17, 312); IX.5,1-42 (CFHB 17, 326-328).
39. Compare the tenth book, where the titles begins with “how” X.1-4; in certain 
chapters of the twelfth book the words ὥστε (thus) and ὅτι (so) have also entered the text as 
the initiatives for the “how case” XII.B.18-23.
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λεγομένη ἐπικάμπιος ὀπισθία (<7. The Formation Called Convex>) and the 
first sentence is Πῶς δεῖ τὴν σύμμικτον τάξιν ἤγουν ἐπικάμπιον ὀπισθίαν 
γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ τί χρησίμη ἐστίν; (How should the mixed or convex 
formation be drawn up and for what is it useful?)40. The original text that 
had been reproduced by the author of the Strategicon at this certain point 
could indeed be, according to the sharp commentary of Rance, an obscure 
abstract of Arrianus41. Consequently, the form of the title at this point, i.e. 
the direct question, might provide a link to the author’s bibliography, to the 
specific military texts, which he studied, copied, or compiled. At length the 
Strategicon of Maurice is extremely useful for the education of the potential 
military man, whose obvious queries were presented and solved by the 
text. The handbook known as the “Problemata of Leo VI”, a version of the 
Strategicon dated at the late 10th c., in which no reference to the Strategicon 
has been recorded42, is in fact the accurate reproduction of the military 
treatise of the late 6th c. in the form of questions and answers, sentence by 
sentence, a purposeful, didactic, presentation of the text. 
In the end, it should be within the bounds of probability to suggest that the 
“direct question” in the place of the title of certain chapters of the Strategicon, 
could had been the appropriate Byzantine style to point to the actual use 
of former texts and thus to illustrate the systematic copy of an authorized 
bibliography if a compilation had taken place. On the other hand, the chapters 
of the treatise titled “on” are actually the abstracts where the military theory 
is fully presented by means of arguments, like short compositions among 
the itemized instructions of the military protocol. They might reflect the 
philological style pointing to the personal contribution of the writer43.
40. According to the SB 6, 303,1-2 this precise question is the unique title and no text 
has been printed above.
41. rance, The Fulcum, 277.
42. Leonis VI Sapientis Problemata, ed. A. Dain, Paris 1935; HunGer, Hochsprachliche 
Literatur, 2, 331 =Βυζαντινή Λογοτεχνία 3, 169; A. Dain, Les stratégistes byzantines, TM 2 
(1967), 317-390, esp. 354.
43. Compare Syrianus Magister (= Three Byzantine Military Treatises, ed. G.T. DenniS 
[CFHB 25], Washington, D. C., 1985, 1-141, text in 10-134): 14 out of 47 chapters are 
titled after indirect questions the 7, 11, 12, 18, 20, 28, 33-38, 45-46 and the text below is 
initiated by some proper introductory word, the most usual.  On the contrary the text below 
titles commencing with “on” is quite often an answer to a direct question. On the dating 
of the military treatise in the 6th c. or far later see Ph. Rance, The Date of the Military 
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The hypothesis concerning the structure of the titles, as discussed above, 
could be supported by the eleventh book, XI (CFHB 17, 352) Περὶ τῶν ἑκάστου 
ἔθνους ἐθῶν τε καὶ τάξεων (On the mores and the tactics of every nation), 
which commences with a formal introduction, the πρόλογος (preamble) in 
XI,3-13 (CFHB 17, 352). The book was created by the author himself, who 
probably had access to official documents of the “foreign bureau” of that date44. 
All four chapters of XI are titled after the indirect question initiated with the 
word “how” and they are presented in the form of an inclusive composition of 
ideas, where pieces of official information have been put together and, as far as 
the syntax is concerned, all required introductory words. Finally the title of the 
antiquated XII.D comes double XII.D, 60-62 (CFHB 17, 490): Περὶ κυνηγίων. 
(On hunting.). Πῶς δεῖ ἄγρια ζῶα κυνηγεῖν… (How one ought to hunt wild 
animals…). The text below is properly composed with every initiative required; 
the introductory paragraph links to some military philosophy which recalls 
the ideas presented via the opening of the book “On Strategy”, VII.A,1-53 esp. 
4-12, 45-49 (CFHB 17, 228, 230).
b. Four Notes
Σαγιττόβολον (bowshot)
The word “σαγιττοβόλο-ς/-ν” (bowshot) identifies the target range of 
the archer, in other words the distance that corresponded to the flight of his 
arrow, and it has been used as a common distance measure since ancient times. 
Dennis has surmised that the distance mentioned within the Strategicon was 
a “not accurate target range”45, in spite of the fact that other scholars have 
come to specific conclusions about the length of the Byzantine bowshot. 
The range of the mounted archer at the time  of Maurice (582-602) 
corresponded to a distance of about 133 m according to Bivar46, who 
discussed the Byzantine bowshot of the late 6th c. /early 7th c. comparatively, 
Compendium of Syrianus Magister (formerly the Sixth Century Anonymus Byzantinus), BZ 
100 (2007), 701-737.
44. Therefore the eleventh book has performed the touchstone of the authorship of the 
treatise, see J. E. Witta, The Ethnika in Byzantine Military Treatises, Minessota University, 
Phil.D. diss., 1977, Ann Arbor 1988, 17-20.
45. Maurice’s Strategikon, trans. DenniS, 31 n. 3.  
46. A. D. H. Bivar, Cavalry Equipment and Tactics on the Euphrates Frontier, DOP 26 
(1972), 271-291, esp. 282 n. 42, 283. 
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by taking into account “textbooks dealing with Muslim techniques of 
archery”. Mc Leod also suggested the same length, paying attention to a 
certain quotation from the Strategicon, mentioned in III.8,43-46 (CFHB 17, 
170), in which numbers are available, but he pointed to the hypothetical 
nature of the abstract47. The example has been cited in order for the available 
space between the lines of the cavalry to be calculated at the minimum. 
The distance measured in III.8,43-46 appears to be the appropriate distance 
between the mounted units, which was equal to one bowshot according, 
for example to II.4,9-10, (CFHB 17, 80); II.15,7 (CFHB 17, 132). Mc 
Leod however was suspicious of its accuracy: the ‘hypothetical example’ 
determines that the space required for each fully equipped horseman should 
be 1,50 m., i.e. the length of the horse, while a knight normally needs ca 
three times this space. Consequently it appears to be “an example of typical 
military mathematics”48. At the end of his commentary Mc Leod underlined 
the variation between the common ancient bowshot (ca 300 m) and the 
supposed Byzantine (133 m), if III.8,43-46 (CFHB 17, 170) is considered to 
be accurate49. In addition he compared the Byzantine measurements to the 
average Arabic and Turkish bowshots, from 160 m to 190 m.50.
A formal reference dated in the late 10th c., recorded in the military 
treatise of Leo VI, lead modern scholars to assume that the full bowshot 
at that date should correspond to a distance from 297 m to 337 m.51. The 
valuable citation that provides us with clear numbers, came to enlighten 
the measures used at that time, in order to match the different devices to 
each other, then to make one rule for the bowshot, no matter the device 
used. Precisely two akin measuring devices are supposed to identify τὴν 
σύμμετρον τοῦ τοξότου βολὴν (the full measured target range of the archer), 
47. W. Mc Leod, The range of ancient bow, Phoenix. Revue de la Société canadienne 
des études classiques 19.1 (1965), 1-14, esp. 11.
48. The speculation of Mc Leod could perfectly also apply to Ι�.5,9-11 (CFHB 17, 326): 
estimation of the size of any far-off army force.
49. Mc Leod, The range, 11.
50. Idem, 13; 14: average Arabic = 169 m-187 m; average Turkish = 160 m-190 m.
51. E. Schilbach, Byzantinische Metrologie [Handbuch d. Altertumswiss. XII/4,] 
München 1970, 42; T. G. KoliaS, Byzantinische Waffen. Ein Beitrag zur byzantinischen 
Waffenkunde von den Anfängen bis zur lateinischen Eroberung [BV 17], Wien 1988, 220; 
Three Treatises, ed. Haldon, 170.
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either the 156 ὀργυιaί (fathoms) or the 170 - 180 simple fathoms52, which are 
compatible with each other after the proportion 1,08 - 1,15 simple fathom 
to be the equivalent for the (current) fathom. Mc Leod did not interpret the 
clause, for he could not provide an undisputable number for the length of the 
“Byzantine fathom”53. This coincides with the proposals of modern scholars, 
as far as the length of the full bowshot is concerned, for Mc Leod compares the 
Byzantine full measured bowshot to the super effective Turkish bowshot, of 
310 m.54. The accurate distance of the two kinds of fathoms notwithstanding, 
the information pinpoints a correlation between them, giving one and only 
distance for the length of the (full) bowshot, i.e. ca 330 m, with the proviso 
that the generally accepted proportion is 1 fathom = 210,8 cm. 
Then again, for the sake of the valuable Strategicon, it is noteworthy 
that the measurements required for the effectiveness of the army were not 
connected exclusively with either the distance covered from the arrow or a 
certain, the same, distance, a fact which is indeed declared via this specific 
military treatise in relation to the infantry. In XII.B.17,17-18 (CFHB 17, 
450) the distance of either 100 feet or 200 feet is equally right55, and recalls 
the variation of the ancient bowshot to be from 60 m to 700 m.56. Besides, 
the distance of 100 feet, a little less than 30 m, has been cited to be the 
distance required at war between the cavalry unit and its’ medical corps, 
II.9,5-6 (CFHB 17, 126). Furthermore in XII.B.20,17 (CFHB 17, 458), at 
the exact place of the expected bowshot, we read that the distance measured 
corresponds to the flight of the stone: τὰ μέρη περιπατεῖν ἀφεστῶτα 
ἀλλήλων ὡς ἀπὸ λίθου βολῆς (the units should march keeping a distance 
of the flight of the stone between them). Every other distance concerning 
the infantry is recorded to have been the length of a bowshot, see XII.B 
(passim). The flight of the arrow was not considered to identify a specific 
distance, for there is mentioned the τέλειον σαγιττόβολον, i.e. long (perfect 
52. The relevant clause is cited in Sylloge Tacticorum quae olim “inedita Leonis 
Tactica” dicebatur, ed. A. Dain, Paris 1933; see also commentary in Schilbach, Byzantinische 
Metrologie, 42 and calculations in KoliaS, Waffen, 220: 1 fathom = 210,8 cm.
53. Mc Leod, The range, 12.
54. Mc Leod, The range, 14:  super Turkish 310 m; see Bivar, Cavalry, 283: the distance 
of the effective bowshot should have been 228,6 m.
55. Schilbach, Byzantinische Metrologie, 13-16: 1 roman foot = 29,6 cm; 1 byzantine 
foot: 31,23 cm.
56. Mc Leod, The range, 1.
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bowshot), in XII.B.18,2 (CFHB 17, 454) instead of the expected sagittovolon 
that matches the case perfectly. 
The length of the Byzantine σαγιττόβολον (bowshot) and the τέλειον 
σαγιττόβολον (long bowshot), depended on the archers and their bows or/
and the measuring device in use, along with certain subdivisions in relation 
to the launched object, which depended on men either mounted or on foot. It 
is then practical to admit the bowshot to have been long undersized from 297 
m and the long bowshot closer possible to ca. 337 m, the “bowshot” and the 
“long bowshot” respectively, on condition that these distances are compatible 
a) (the bowshot) with the Arabic and the Turkish average bowshots; and 
b) (the long bowshot) to the super Turkish bowshot, as well as to modern 
calculations concerning the full measured Byzantine bowshot of the 10th 
c.57. Furthermore, we should accept that every σαγιττόβολον (bowshot) cited 
within the Strategicon with no further definition, should be a distance of 
(“not accurate target range” as Dennis proposed) closer to 133 m as Mac 
Leod suspected, Bivar proposed and the ‘military mathematics’ provided by 
the Strategicon in III.8,43-46 (CFHB 17, 170), support. Finally the distance 
that corresponded to the flight of the stone should have been close to 30 m.
Fossaton camp
More than one term ordinarily identifies the structure of the military 
camp within the Strategicon. i) ἄπληκτον (< aplicitum, i.e. a portable 
folding structure), which eventually applied to every guarded campground 
and prison; ii) φοσσάτον (< fossa <fodio: to trench) which literally applied 
to the structure surrounded by a fossa, i.e. being reinforced with a trench; 
iii) (χάραξ) (< χαράσσω: to engrave, i.e. to excavate); and iv) /ὄρυγμα ( 
ὀρύσσω: to mine, i.e. to excavate), also with the meaning of prison as well58. 
As far as the military terminology within the Strategicon is concerned, it 
57. Mc Leod, The range, 13: the average Arabic = ca 169m-187m; the average Turkish 
=160m-190m and the super Turkish = 310 m; KoliaS, Waffen, 220: 297 m-337 m; Three 
Treatises, ed. Haldon, 170: 328,8 m.
58. Etymology: DemetrakoS, Μέγα λεξικόν, 757 (ἀπλίκιτον); 7633 (φοσσᾶτον); 5240 
(ὂρυγμα); 7792 (χάραξ); meaning: Sudae Lexicon, v. I, 289 (n.3228: ἄπληκτον); v. III, 564 
(n.5240: ὄρυγμα); v. IV, 788 (n.96: χάραξ). On military camps of the Roman and the Late 
Roman era see Syrianus Magister, ed. DenniS, 329-335; H. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe 
AD 350–425, Oxford 1996, 247; C. M. Gilliver, The De munitionibus castrorum: text and 
translation, Journal of Roman Equipment Studies 4 (1993), 33-48, esp. 35.
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seems that the two latter terms, which are the Ancient Greek words for 
ditch, applied to the undersized trench59 and appear to fit merely in the 
vernacular vocabulary of the infantry. Among these four terms, the almost 
archaic word ἄπληκτον and the most recent φοσσάτον are typical terms 
of Latin origin, which, at the late 6th c., used to be the common words 
for the military camp and are both documented frequently in the military 
treatise. At a first sight the terms appear to be equivalent, such as in I.3,35 
(CFHB 17, 86): ...τὰ ἄπληκτα ἤτοι φοσσάτα (the aplecta camps that is to 
say the fossata camps); IX.5,83 (CFHB 17, 330): ἐὰν ὁ χάραξ, τουτέστιν τὸ 
φοσσάτον (…the ditch, i.e. the fossaton camp). However, via a number of 
functional quotations, cited in several passages, an important difference is 
detected which points to technical improvements that applied to construction 
during Late Antiquity. This improvement was an extra fossa (i.e. trench, gr. 
τάφρος), which served for the protection of the main military camp. 
The antiquated tenth book, which refers to the topic of sieges, conveys 
to the general advise concerning the construction of temporary military 
camps; the fence here appears to correspond to the complete fortification 
of the aplecton camp; X.4,74-75 (CFHB 17, 346): τόπον ὀχυρὸν...ξηρᾷ ὕλῃ 
περιβληθῆναι (a stronghold… to be surrounded by dry woods)60. Elsewhere 
it appears that either the fence or the trench performed the adequate 
fortification, IX.5,83-84 (CFHB 17, 330): ὁ χάραξ τουτέστιν τὸ φοσσάτον 
τάφρῳ ἢ οἰκοδομίαις ὠχύρωται (…the camp is fortified either by the trench 
or by the structures). In general, however, the dyke that strengthened the 
structure, either was excavated in order to provide some soil in the function 
of building stuff, so the trench (i.e. the fossa) occurred artlessly, or it was 
extracted as a result of the creation of the required ditches, so that the camp 
could be provided with some additional protection. Indeed in XII.B.22,3-5 
(CFHB 17, 472) a structure had to be established, if possible, then a trench 
had to be dug and a dyke had to be erected: ...οἰκοδομεῖν, ἐὰν ὁ τόπος ἔχῃ,… 
59. The terms χάραξ and ὄρυγμα identify ditches other than the main trench, for 
example in IX.3,98-99 (CFHB 17, 318), and these other trenches are recorded to be smaller 
than the main one in XII.B.22,5-6 (CFHB 17, 472).
60. Urbicius at the beginning of the 6th c. advised the army to be fenced around, in 
order to be fortified; ditches are not mentioned in the relevant clauses, 5,29-34 and 6,35-36, 
see G. Greatrex (ed.), Urbicius’ Epitedeuma: an edition, translation and commentary, BZ 98 
(2005), 35-72, esp. 56 and commentary 50.
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καὶ ἔξωθεν τάφρον ποιεῖν... καὶ τὸ χῶμα ἐν τῇ ἐσωτέρᾳ ὄψει τεθῆναι (to 
built if material exists... and to dig the trench outside... and to place the 
earth from the inner side...). Consequently one should admit that the aplecta 
camps used to be surrounded by a certain common ditch outside the fence. 
It is important though to pay attention to the diagram in XII.C (CFHB 
17, 488), in view of the fact that military camps were supposed to be erected 
according to this precise diagram with the intention that the structure 
would become stronger than usual, VII.A.7,6 (CFHB 17, 236): φοσσάτα 
ὀχυρώτερα ποιεῖν κατὰ τὸ ὑποτεταγμένον σχῆμα (camps extra fortified 
ought to be constructed, according to the diagram below). The explanation 
of the above mentioned diagram, XII.C,2-3; 5-6 (CFHB 17, 488), should 
be that two trenches could reinforce further the illustrated military camp: 
Δεῖ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔξωθεν τοῦ καραγοῦ χαραγὴ δηλοῖ φόσσαν, τὰ δὲ 
λάμβδα τριβόλους (the line outside the caragos indicates a fossa, the signs 
of letter λ after that caltrops); χρὴ δὲ καὶ ἔξωθεν τῶν τριβόλων ὄρυγμα 
γίνεσθαι (also a ditch ought to take place outside the caltrops’ zone). 
Furthermore the inner fossa is certainly cited in VII.B.9,4 (CFHB 17, 
248): περὶ τὴν ἔσω τάφρον (around the inner trench). Additional ditches of 
non clarified purpose are also documented as required for the appropriate 
defense of the camp, in IX.3,98-99 (CFHB 17, 318): καὶ ἐν τάξει τὰ 
ὀρύγματα γίνεσθαι δεόντως τῆς τάφρου (the ditches ought to be made 
properly, especially the trench) and in XII.B.22,5-6 (CFHB 17, 472): ἔξωθεν 
δὲ ταύτης …καὶ φόσσας μικρὰς (then outside it, i.e. outside of the trench, 
small trenches also). Such trenches could provide all potential infantrymen 
outside the camp with significant protection, as it is presented in X.4,18 
(CFHB 17, 348)61. But within the Strategicon no front guards are recorded in 
relation to the defense of the camp, except for the γνωμικὸν in VIII.B,99-100 
(CFHB 17, 284 <nr. 36>), which might well have been the reminiscent of 
the ancient methods. Thus the reported unmanned ditches would serve the 
enemy, unless all trenches around the military camp used to fit together. 
61. More than one trenchs had to be excavated around the χάραξ according to Syrianus 
Magister, ed. DenniS, 88: κθ ʹ, 2 εὐθέως ἀνίστασθαι καὶ διορύττειν τὰς τάφρους (89: “As soon 
as the soldiers have pitched their tents and gotten something to eat, they should get up and 
start digging trenches”). However only one trench was about to surround the camp, according 
to the detailed description below. The other trenches were supposed to protect the front guards 
and they had to be established at a distance of the camp, like “forward towers”, idem, 90.
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Accordingly, the φοσσάτον should have been the improved ἄπληκτον 
camp, which enjoyed full protection by means of a fence, plus the trench, 
plus the caltrop zone, plus the extra trench or the ditches around it. Both 
mounted and foot warriors had to cover a long distance, full of traps, in order 
to approach the final fortification, i.e. the fence. The blockage against the 
mounted enemy consisted of three single but adjoining obstacles, even four, 
if an extra trench existed in front of the caltrop zone. The fortification at a 
row obviously turned to be a significant complex, the break of which required 
extremely trained horses and riders, as far as the animals have to pace specific 
number of steps of particular size in order to accomplish every jump over. The 
technological progress taking place during Late Antiquity, when the cavalry 
of the Late Roman Empire was at the zenith of its performance, as it adjusted 
to the challenge of the nomadic cavalry. It is noteworthy at this point to evoke 
the place name “Chandax” (χάνδαξ < arab. rabḍ al-khandāq: “Castle of the 
Moat” < khandāq: deep brook), which was the medieval name of Herakleion 
at Crete due to the double trench full of water that protected the city62. 
Touldos
a. Strategicon offers the most significant information on the issue of the 
τοῦλδος63. The term touldos/n identified the baggage train of the Byzantine 
cavalry as is confirmed by the Strategicon I.3,39-40 (CFHB 17, 88), i.e. the 
supplies for the soldiers that included servants and livestock: Καὶ τοῦλδός 
ἐστιν ἡ ἀποσκευὴ τῶν στρατιωτῶν, τουτέστιν, παῖδές τε καὶ ὑποζύγια καὶ 
τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα (touldos is the baggage of the soldiers, i.e., youngsters, equine 
of burden and further animals). The animals serving with the baggages of 
the infantry, the caragos (wagon train), are somethimes also called τοῦλδος. 
Although only bodive are mentioned for the καραγός64, the reference to 
ἵππους σαγματαρίους (saddle pack equi) in XII.B.6,11 (CFHB 17, 422) 
62. Leonis Diaconi, Historia, ed. C. B. haSe [CSHB, Bonn 1832], 11: in I.5.19-20 
testified are the two trenches; etymology of the word chandax: G. D. BambinioteS, Λεξικό 
της νέας ελληνικής γλώσσας, Αθήνα 2002, 1932 (χαντάκι).
63. Limited information is detected in relevant edicts of a later era and in certain 
passages of the military treatises of the 10th c., see P. Collinet, Sur l’expression οἱ ἐν τοῖς 
τούλδοις ἀπερχόμενοι, ‘ceux qui partent dans les bagages’, in: Mélanges Charles Diehl I. 
Histoire, ed. E. Leroux, Paris 1930, 49–54, esp. 49-51. However modern scholars have not 
exploited extensively the fascinating details from the Strategicon.
64. XII.B.18,8 (CFHB 17, 454); XII.B.22 passim (CFHB 17, 472-80).
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clearly points towards the equine of burden, i.e. pack mules, what could be 
considered the reflection of the status of the cursus publicus of that date65. 
So the obvious difference between the two words should naturally originate 
from the kind of animal serving the train: bodive served with caragos 
(wagon train), equine served with τοῦλδος (baggage train). Elsewhere the 
term touldos applies to the baggage train in general, along with the term 
ἀποσκευὴ (baggage) (I-XII passim, except for the books V [τοῦλδος only] 
and XI [ἀποσκευὴ only]). The interesting term ἡ ἵππος (the Equus) appears 
in certain citations, related exclusively to the war horses, both active and 
spare66. Furthermore the distinction between the Equus (the military equi 
caballi) and the Baggage (the baggage train) is apparent throughout the 
eleventh book, but no citation of those terms occurs in the fifth book, where 
the topic of the baggage train is fully presented. Finally, along with the term 
ἵππος (equus) the term ἄλογον (irrational being) is used with the meaning of 
“horse”, passim, and it is generally accepted that this is indeed a neologism 
of the middle/late 6th c. and that the word entered the text of the Strategicon 
at that time67. It is worthwhile to elucidate the exact use of the term by the 
author of the military treatise in view of the fact that the term ἵππος (equus) 
applies almost exclusively to the military equi caballi at war, i.e. on the battle 
field, at the exact time of fighting or if being trained for fighting, whereas the 
term ἄλογον (horse) applies in general to the horses serving with the army, 
both skilled spare war horses and inexperienced equidae of burden. As far 
as the language of the Strategicon is concerned, it should be emphasized that 
ἄλογον (horse) is distinct from ἵππος (military equus caballus)68.
The fifth book, which bears the title “on touldos” V.1-5 (CFHB 17, 
208-214) refers to the spare war horses and the baggage train as if they 
were considered to be one military corps, since three out of the five chapters 
65. “ὁ πλατὺς δρόμος” (the cursus clabularis) i.e. the imperial service of transportation 
that depended on bodive, had been abolished before the composition of the Strategicon, as a result 
of the replacement of the bodive by equine, see JoneS, Later Roman Empire, 833; M. F. Hendy 
Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy c.300-1450, Cambridge Mass. 1985, 607-610.
66. VII.Α.9 (CFHB 17, 236); XI.1,20  (CFHB 17, 354); XI.4,116-18 (CFHB 17, 378).
67. Etymology: DemetrakoS, Μέγα λεξικόν, 289-290 (ἄλογον) consecutively: animal 
of burden, military equid of burden, equus caballus or of burden.
68. It is traditionally suggested that, at the beginning, �λογον (irrational being) was 
contrasted to soldier (rational being); Strategicon does not provide evidence to support the 
hypothesis.
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plainly refer to both, the first chapter relating to the baggage train itself and 
the second to the reserved war horses alone69. Indeed we read in V.3,6 (CFHB 
17, 210): τὸν πλείονα καὶ ἄχρηστον τοῦλδον καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἄλογα (the 
surplus and not required touldos and the extra horses); and in V.4,2-3 (CFHB 
17, 212): Ἐκεῖθὲν τε ἐκ τοῦ τούλδου κινοῦντας τοὺς ἐπὶ μάχην παραλαβεῖν 
τὰ ἀδέστρατα καὶ ἢ τένδας μικρὰς (those [men] who move from the touldos 
up to the combat ought to take the spare horses plus either small tents…
)70. In reality, the touldos should have included the reserved equi caballi 
occasionally, given that in III.7 (CFHB 17, 168) the diagram explaining the 
modus operandi of the battle formation of the total army, corresponded to 
the reserved force being lined up along with the τοῦλδος, in order to increase 
the size of the army. The reasonable connection between every equine of the 
cavalry might be understood by the instruction concerning the size of the 
baggage train, according to which the number of the active war horses of 
each mounted unit determined the number of the spare horses, the number 
of the servants as well as the required equine of burden, V.1,14-17 (CFHB 17, 
208, 210)71. Regarding the watering and the feeding of all those animals, it is 
stated that both equi caballi and equine of burden required similar treatment. 
Both τοῦλδος and καραγὸς accompanied the units they served and in 
fact each “train” had to follow in the back of its own unit, V.5,4-6 (CFHB 
17, 214); XII.B.18,1-4 (CFHB 17, 454). However, if the cavalry was moving 
across insecure territory, its touldos had to be placed in the middle and 
to be well guarded, V.4,1-3 (CFHB 17, 214); IX.3,87-88 (CFHB 17, 316); 
69. Book nr. V (CFHB 17, 208): περὶ τούλδου (on baggage train); V.1 Περὶ τοῦ μὴ 
ἐπάγεσθαι προχείρως τὸν τοῦλδον ἐν μάχῃ (on never driving the baggage train to the 
combat improperly); V.2 Περὶ ἀδεστράτων (on reserved war horses); V.3 Περὶ τοῦ μὴ 
ἀναγκαίου τούλδου (on the unnecessary baggage train); V.4 Περὶ τῶν ἐν μέσῳ ἀπλήκτων 
(on those laying intermediate camps); V.5 Περὶ φυλακῆς τούλδου ὁδοιποροῦντος (on the 
guarding of the baggage train on the march).
70. The ἀδέστρατον (< the horse ad dextram, at the right side, of the groom) was the 
spare war horse.
71. S. Gyftopoulou, Riding and reserving equi in the Late Antique/Middle Byzantine 
Army, Βυζαντινός Δόμος 16 (2007-2008), 389-410, esp. 401: in view of the reports of the 
Strategicon counted are one to two war horses for each individual soldier of every regular 
unit (no more than one for the men of the assistant units) and two to four horses for the riders 
of the distinguished units, the foederatoi and the boukellarioi. On the number of spare horses 
inside the Byzantine army see also J. Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine 
World, 565-1204, London 1999, 143 (one spare horse per soldier).
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XII.B.20,17-20 (CFHB 17, 458). The animals of the wagon train on the other 
hand were placed at some distance so that any wounded ox could not disturb 
the soldiers according to XII.B.22,108-09 (CFHB 17, 478). The distinction 
as far as the baggage trains of the field forces is concerned has to be drawn 
regarding their performance in the battlefield, where the non- guarded 
καραγὸς was regularly transformed into a formal line of defense, even 
supported the flanks of the main force, XII.B.17,5-6 (CFHB 17, 450): τάξαι 
τὴν παράταξιν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦλδον [“line up the battle formation…and 
the touldos (of the infantry)]”; X.B.18,1 (CFHB 17, 454): Πῶς δεῖ τὰς ἁμάξας 
καὶ τὸν τοῦλδον τάσσεσθαι (“How to line up the vehicles and the touldos”)72. 
On the other hand the τοῦλδος of the cavalry, i.e. the valuable reserved war 
horses among the other animals, was absolutely protected and ought to avoid 
getting involved in conflicts73. Besides, the βάνδον of the τουλδοφύλαξ, i.e. 
the unit that guarded the τοῦλδος according to III.7,10 (CFHB 17, 168), was 
considered to perform some crucial duty, and the author of the Strategicon 
states that its leader had to be an experienced soldier in VII.B.17,29-30 
(CFHB 17, 264). But the τοῦλδος could take a special position inside the 
battlefield. It could be placed either between the rear guards, so that the 
feature of the war force could be enlarged, III.7 (CFHB 17, 166, 168), or at 
the side of the right flank of the second war line, in order to be protected 
should surprise attack occur, VII.B.9,12-14 (CFHB 17, 248). In the latter 
case the τοῦλδος ought to be accompanied by the appropriate guard unit. 
Otherwise, it was forbidden to all spare equine of the cavalry to approach 
the front, such as in V.2 (CFHB 17, 210): instruction plus military theory74. 
The baggage train of the cavalry depended on young servants “free or 
slaves” but even the less competent soldiers were transferred there from time to 
72. Καραγὸς < (gothic) carago; the term actually identified the fence of the military 
camp, which was formed by the vehicles of the baggage train.
73. See for example V.1 (CFHB 17 pp. 208, 210); VII.B.9,8-9 (CFHB 17, 248).
74. In III.7 (CFHB 17, 168) the spare horses are supposed to be in position inside the 
battle field, but no mention of grooms is quoted; Dagron believes that certainly every groom 
was present inside the combat zone at the late 10th c., Le traité sur le guerilla (de velitatione 
bellica) de l’empereur Nichéphoros Phocas (963-969), ed. – trans. G. daGron - h. mihăeScu, 
Paris 1986, commentary, 189; Mc Geer also comments on the horses lined behind the lines 
of the cavalry in Nicephoros Uranos, Praecepta militaria (part), ed. E. McGeer, Sowing 
the dragon’s teeth: Byzantine warfare in the tenth century, Washington, D.C. 1995, ch. 57.1: 
compare V.2 (CFHB 17, 210).
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time, according to I.2,70-74 (CFHB 17, 82). The requirements of the campaign 
rested on the principle of one servant looking after three or four σαγμάρια 
(pack mules), I.2,70-74 (CFHB 17, 82), plus one servant for every three or 
four mounted soldiers. Then, each individual reserve equus caballus possibly 
enjoyed the full attention of one groom at the time of the battle, compare V.2 
(CFHB 17, 210). The groom had also to drive the spare horse inside the bat-
tlefield, as is confirmed in V.4,2-3 (CFHB 17, 212). As far as the baggage train 
of the infantry is concerned, the procedure of recruiting the servants appears 
to have been the same, but no numbers are documented within the Strategicon.
b. Traditionally it is accepted that the etymology of the word τοῦλδος 
indicates a link between the past tense of the verb fero, from the medieval 
Latin, and the baggage train of the Byzantine army: tuli>touldos; the word 
bears the meaning of “lifting weigh” in the Etymologies of Isidore, bishop 
of Seville (556-636), which were composed shortly after the Strategicon 
or at the same time period75. Collinet attempted to link the word τοῦλδος 
to German76, given that the soundalike words dult and tult were common 
ancient Germanic words and thus they could be placed among the numerous 
barbaric military terms that entered both Latin and Greek languages77. 
Nevertheless, both words meant “celebration”78.
75. See A. Dain, Touldos’ et ‘Touldon’ dans les traités militaires, ΠAΓKAPΠEIA 
Mélanges Henri Grégoire II, Annuaire de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales et 
Slaves, X (1950), 161–169, esp. 164-167 on the grammar (touldos, i.e. m., or touldon, i.e. n) 
and 169 on the etymology; see also Collinet, Bagages, 53-54 and Dain, Touldos, 162-163 on 
the terms touldos and aposkeuē (baggage).
76. Collinet, Bagages 54.
77. See H. ZilliacuS, Zum Kampf der Weltsprachen im oströmischen Reich, Helsinki 
1965, 128-133; 141-167. Latin had been the formal military language up to 630, and thus 
elements of the native languages of the soldiers, German but others as well, entered Latin, see H. 
and r. kahane, The Western Impact of Byzantium: the Linguistic Evidence, DOP 36 (1982), 
127-153, esp. 130; Rance, Fulcum, 269; ZilliacuS, Zur Kampf, 113. The barbaric terms were 
romanized under Constantine I (313/324-337) and a military ‘slang’ was developed, see Kahane 
idem; then, gradually, the words entered the Greek language as well, see H. MihăeScu, Die Lage 
der zwei Weltsprachen (Griechisch und Latein) im byzantinischen Reich des 7. Jahrhunderts als 
Merkmal einer Zeitwende, in: Studien zum 7. Jhr. in Byzanz, (BBA 47), Berlin 1976, 95-100, 
esp. 90; G. Reichenkron, Zur römischen Kommandosprache bei byzantinischen Schriftstellern, 
BZ 54 (1961), 18-27, esp. 19, 20, 23.
78. H. MeidinGer, Dictionnaire comparatif et étymologique des langues teuto-
gothiques, Boston2  1875, 404.
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But the speculation of Collinet should not be underestimated, since 
Byzantine military terminology normally arises from barbaric languages 
and cultures in the cases were those words identified special military 
articles or tactics that characterized certain barbarians at war79. Thus it is 
suggested that the etymology of the word τοῦλδος might be located within 
the vocabulary of the nomads of Northeastern Asia, i.e. the Avars and the 
Turks80. These people used to travel constantly, accompanied by a large 
number of horses, as is reported by the author of the Strategicon XI.2,31-
2 (CFHB 17, 362): Ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ πλῆθος ἀλόγων, ἀρρένων 
τε καὶ θηλειῶν ἅμα μὲν πρὸς ἀποτροφήν, ἅμα δὲ διὰ πλήθους θεωρίαν 
(They are also followed by numerous of horses, both male and female, as 
they are fed from, plus they look numerous). Perhaps a specific Altaic word 
was used to identify the flexible group of horses that served the nomads as 
the ultimate resource, fertile and thus everlasting. At the date that the word 
τοῦλδος entered both Greek and Latin, the soldiers of the Byzantine Empire 
were familiar with the art of war of those nomads. Although neither the 
Avars nor the Turks served within the Byzantine army, unlike the barbarians 
whose language entered Latin and Greek commonly, the soldiers of the Late 
Roman Empire had to be taught by the war methods of the nomadic cavalry 
as the author of the Strategicon precisely recommends81.The nomadic 
baggage train could have provided a model to the καραγὸς (wagon train) 
at the time that equine replaced bodive in the army82, in addition to the 
fact that it entered the Byzantine world as a unique campaign apparatus, 
79. Ph. Rance, Drungus, δροῦγγος and δρουγγιστί: a Gallicism and Continuity in Late 
Roman Cavalry Tactics, Phoenix 58 (2004), 96-130, esp. 100-105.
80. On Avars see W. Pohl, Die Awaren. Ein Steppenvolk in Mitteleuropa, 567-822, 
Munich 1988; on contacts of Avars with the Byzantine Empire see, Die Awaren am Rand 
der byzantinischen Welt. Studien zur Diplomatie, Handel und Technologietransfer im 
Frühmittelalter ed. F. Daim [Monographien Frühgeschichte und Mittelalterarchäologie 
7], Innsbruck 2000; G. KardaraS, Το Βυζάντιο και οι Άβαροι Στ΄-Θ΄ αι. [Institute for 
Byzantine Research- Hellenic National Research Foundation-Monographs 10], Athens 2010; 
on their contribution to the military technology see B. Sz. SzmoniewSki, The earliest Avar-
age stirrups, or the ‘stirrup controversy’ revisited, in: The other Europe in the Middle Ages. 
Avars, Bulgars, Khazars, and Cumans, eds. Fl. Curta - R. Kovalev, Boston 2008, 297-326. 
On Turks see C. V. Findley, The Turks in World History, Oxford 2005.
81. In I.2,45-46, 61 (CFHB 17 pp 80, 82) and in II.1,19-20 (CFHB 17, 110).
82. On the issue of the replacement of the bodive by equine see above n. 65.
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effective and thus worthwhile to be imitated. Τοῦλδος could be linked to the 
Altaic lexis, on condition that an unidentified complex of the Chinese lǚ tú 
(voyage) and duò/ tuó (carry on the back) might have existed in the Middle 
Mongolic language83. 
Depotatus/os
Valuable information concerning the assistant unit of δηποτάτοι is 
recorded in the Strategicon84. According to II.9 (CFHB 17, 126, 128) the 
unit incorporated trained regular soldiers of lower rank, who were excluded 
from their own units in order to perform unarmed on behalf of their own 
comrades at the time of conflict or immediately afterwards. Normally 
they represented three percent of the total army (eight to ten δηποτάτοι 
per βάνδον, i.e. ca 300 men), as confirmed in ΙΙ.9, 1-5 (CFHB 17, 126). 
According to the occasion, soldiers were excluded from the subdivision of 
each military unit, from every 100 or 50 men, after the proportion of six to 
eight men per unit85. They plundered the corpses of the defeated enemy, took 
care of the wounded86, and eventually acted as the official rescue team as is 
confirmed in V.2,7-8 (CFHB 17, 210). As far as the Strategicon is concerned, 
they are always reported to be carrying out their mission exclusively inside 
the battlefield87. The δηποτάτοι used to perform either on foot or mounted; 
actually they had access to one horse according to IX.3,69 (CFHB 17, 316); 
the saddle of this horse used to bear one extra stirrup, “σκάλα” (step) to 
83. On the possible interconnection between the Proto-Turkic, the Mongolic-Tungusic, 
the Middle-Mongolic and the Chinese languages see G. StaroStin, Preliminary Lexicostatistics 
as a Basis for a Language Classification: a New Approach, Journal of Language Relationship 
3 (2010), 79-116 (= URL: http://starling.rinet.ru/new100/Lexicostatistics.htm). On the 
translation from Chinese into English compare CC-CEDICT dictionary, URL:. http://www.
mandarintools.com/worddict.html-trip; -carry. 
84. On the civil office of deputatus see Jean Le Lydien, des magistratures de l’état 
roman, ed. J. Schamp, v. 1-2, Paris 2006, II. CCXXIX-CCXLIV.
85. IX.3,62-65 (CFHB 17, 316); IX.3,69 (CFHB 17, 316).
86. plunder: II.9, 13 (CFHB 17, 128); nursing: II.9,6-9 (CFHB 17, 126, 128); I.3,30-32 
(CFHB 17, 86).
87. The ecclesiastical office of depotatus, which is mentioned in the sources from the 
5th c. onwards, was tenured by clergymen of the lower rank, who, according to Leondaritou, 
exercised their duties exclusively inside the church, see V. A. Leontaritou, Εκκλησιαστικά 
αξιώματα και υπηρεσίες στην πρώιμη και μέση Βυζαντινή περίοδο [Forschungen zur 
Byzantinischen Rechtsgeschichte- Athener Reihe 8], Athens-Komotini 1996, 162.
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assist the man to mount, i.e. there were two single stirrups, both by the same 
side of the saddle, one for the depotatos (depotatus) – one for the wounded 
soldier as is confirmed in II.9,25-26 (CFHB 17, 128)88.
Final note
The Strategicon of Maurice was completed at the end of Late Antiquity 
and the text reflects this fascinating era. Admittedly, the military treatise 
conveys more pieces of information concerning the actual life of both 
individual soldiers (of every rank or skill) and formed army forces (of every 
size or competence), either inside the camp or on the battlefield; along with 
the details on the suitable deployment- arm- drill command, the issue of 
timing comes as the apparent benefit for every military action plus the 
favorable geographical conditions. In addition, the text constitutes the most 
reliable source on several topics of military history (military technology - war 
tactics - the state and the art of war of the enemies of the Byzantine Empire 
at that time). But above, all the treatise communicates Byzantine military 
theory. It is noticeable, however, that the Strategicon has not been fully 
exploited, although the existing commentary on a great number of military 
issues that are recorded within the Strategicon is detailed. In spite of the fact 
that the literature on Byzantine military history has treated the subjects 
presented in this paper, our view is that the matters under discussion here 
were not addressed fully. But comparison between the similar quotations 
from different chapters/‘books’ could enluminate the text and sometimes, as 
has become apparent in this paper, could provide clear meaning.
To the notes presented above, one should also add the wise manage-
ment of the people who constituted the army, which formed a feature of 
the military culture of the late Roman Empire but has not been plainly 
detected, although it is very crucial within the Strategicon: instructions, 
advice, moral guidance aimed to train the potential soldier in gaining mili-
tary expertise, spirit and discipline. Moreover, according to the military 
theories presented in several abstracts and in almost every introductory 
88. On the use of the stirrup by the Byzantines see St. LazariS, Considérations sur 
l’apparition de l’étrier: contribution à l’histoire du cheval dans l’Antiquité tardive, in: Les 
équidés dans le monde méditerranéen antique (Actes du colloque par l’École francaise 
d’Athènes, le Centre Camille Jullian, et l’UMR 5140 du CNRS Athènes, 26-28 Novembre 
2003), ed. A. GardeiSen, Paris 2005, 275-88 esp. 276-81.
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passage, the general should aim at the protection of his soldiers in order 
to maintain the army in its best state, but also because he should act in 
respect of God and of his fellow humans. From every aspect the text keeps 
firmly to this concept. 
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hiStorical information Gathered from Mauricii Strategicon
A few relevant sections from the Strategicon of Maurice are analyzed 
in order that Byzantine military tactics be further clarified: the meaning of 
the word scholē; contagion (epidemic) and starvation (famine) threatening 
the soldiers when gathered together; and the potential scouting mission of 
heralds. Additionally, certain facts provided by the treatise regarding specific 
military subjects are presented together so that they can be effectively 
elucidated: the length of both the bowshot and the long bowshot; the exact 
function of the multi trenches of the fossaton military camp; touldos (the 
baggage train: composition - function - etymology/origin); depotatoi (the 
unarmed units: recruitment – equipment - size - mission). Finally speculation 
on the composition of the text attempts to draw attention to The use of 
former treatises by the author and to the degree of his personal contribution. 
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